We conduct a field experiment on 427 Israeli soldiers who each rolled a six-sided die in private and reported the outcome. For every point reported, the soldier received an additional half-hour early release from the army base on Thursday afternoon. We find that the higher a soldier's military entrance score, the more honest he is on average. We replicate this finding on a sample of 156 civilians paid in cash for their die reports. Furthermore, the civilian experiments reveal that two measures of cognitive ability predict honesty, whereas general self-report honesty questions and a consistency check among them are of no value. We provide a rationale for the relationship between cognitive ability and honesty and discuss its generalizability.
Introduction
Is it possible to screen effectively for honesty? This is the million-dollar question for employers interviewing job candidates, investors vetting corporate conference calls, tax auditors, voters watching a political candidates' debate, potential business partners and courting couples, to name a few examples. Continuing with the workplace example, the U.S. retail industry alone loses $53.6 billion a year to employee theft. Moreover, employee theft is on the rise due to poor preemployment screening and a decline in supervision (Brooks 2013) . Can employers do better in screening for honest employees? Polygraph tests have been shown to be unreliable and their use by employers is unlawful in North America and Europe. Neuroscience-based lie-detection technologies remain unproven and in their infancy. Consequently, many employers continue to rely on written personality tests consisting of self-report questions and job interviews led by the company's human resource personnel to evaluate job candidates' honesty. However, a considerable body of research casts doubt on the usefulness of these methods (see, e.g., Morgeson et al. 2007 for a survey and Ones et al. 2007 for a rejoinder).
In this paper, we use the methods of a laboratory experiment on both soldier and civilian populations in the field to determine the effectiveness of the compulsory military entrance exam employed by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to categorize soldiers on the basis of their cognitive ability and honesty, among other traits. We extend Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi's (2013) innovative die-rolling paradigm to the field where 427 soldiers and 156 civilians each rolls a sixsided die in private and reports the outcome. For each additional pip reported on the die, soldiers are rewarded with a half-hour early release from the army base on Thursday and civilians with extra cash payment. We find soldiers with higher exam scores are more honest, that is, report lower die outcomes. On a civilian population that has completed its mandatory military service we again find that a higher entrance exam score predicts a lower die report. The robustness of the relationship between exam score and honesty to a civilian sample eliminates a set of strategic and reputational hypotheses for our result and points to the content of the entrance exam as an invaluable predictor of honesty. However, pinpointing which features of the exam account for honesty is complicated by the diverse number of items that determine a soldier's score. Our experiments on civilians reveal that self-report honesty questions and a consistency check among 3 them cannot explain subjects' variation in reported die outcomes. 2 Instead, higher scores on two cognitive-ability tests (namely, the cognitive reflection task (CRT) (Frederick 2005) and an abbreviated version of the Raven advanced progressive matrices test (Arthur and Day 1994)) predict increased honesty.
In the developmental psychology literature, a wealth of correlational studies dating back to the late 1920s explores the observed relationship between intelligence and socially approved or disapproved behaviors. Among the first studies, Hartshorne and May (1928) collect observational and self-report data from over 10,000 children on three forms of deceptive behavior (cheating, lying and stealing) and attempt to correlate it with numerous traits including intelligence. They provide as their "best estimate of the relation between intelligence and a theoretical combination of all of our deception tests, a correlation of -.50 to -.60" (p. 189) (quoted from Unger 1964, p. 300) .
In summarizing several reviews of this literature, Unger writes that "brains and character actually tend to go together", the existence of a positive relation between intellect and morality "is practically unanimous and unequivocal", "the most helpful and cooperative children [a] re nearly always also among the brightest" and "sixth-grade boys rated to be low in delinquency potential
[are found] to have markedly superior IQ scores". A number of studies have found that cheating on exams is most frequent among students with low grades or low GPA scores (see, e.g.,
Hetherington and Feldman 1964 and the references therein). Gottfredson and Hirschi (1990) review the cross-cultural determinants of crime and conclude that "the individual-level correlates of delinquency that appear everywhere include sexual precocity, limited scholastic aptitude and drug use" (p. 178).
Methodologically closer to our study (i.e., incentivized experiments on dishonest reporting), two recent studies include measures of intelligence as a moderator variable in explaining the relationship between honesty and the variable of interest. Gino and Ariely (2012) find that creativity predicts dishonest reporting across a series of five studies. In one of the studies, the authors also measure intelligence through the CRT and a vocabulary test (verbal intelligence) and show that neither intelligence measure is significantly correlated with dishonesty. Fosgaard et al. (2013) also control for CRT scores in an experiment designed to separate the effect that 4 cheating is an option (i.e., cheating awareness) from the effect that cheating is the norm (i.e., cheating conformity). The authors find that CRT scores are positively associated with the probability of cheating. After finding that kaba scores predict honesty in our soldier experiments, our study shifts to focus on the relationship between intelligence and honesty.
Our study differs from a rapidly expanding experimental literature on honesty (see Rosenbaum et al. (2014) for a survey) in two further respects. First, our subject pool: unlike student subject pools or even most field experiments targeted at a particular population, soldiers completing their mandatory military service constitute a representative cross-section of society as a whole. 3 What is more, this population is particularly well suited to examine the relevance of screening criteria for honesty because military units are highly susceptible to dishonesty. The hierarchical organizational structure inherent in a nation's military inevitably means that a commanding officer who assigns a duty or issues an order to a soldier has no opportunity to verify whether the soldier has completed the assigned task. Yet any well-functioning military relies on honesty between its troops and even seeks this trait when recruiting and promoting soldiers.
Indeed, honesty is among the highest declared values for Israeli soldiers and part of the creed of the Israel Defense Forces.
Another source of novelty of our experiment is that, to the best of our knowledge, it is the first to examine honesty toward one's employer. Soldier subjects in our experiment cheat their boss with whom they interact on a daily basis, rather than an anonymous firm (e.g., Levitt 2006; Pruckner and Sausgruber 2013) , anonymous subjects (e.g., Gneezy, 2005) , wait staff at a restaurant (Azar et al. 2013) , or the experimenter (e.g., Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013) . 4 3 Abeler et al. (2014) conduct an experiment on honesty by telephone on a representative sample of German respondents. Other experiments conducted on soldiers are: Goette et al. (2012) who compare the in-group cooperativeness and willingness to punish of extant groups of Swiss soldiers with those of randomly formed groups of soldiers. Lahav et al. (2011) distribute questionnaires on trains traveling between major Israeli cities to soldiers, teenagers and university students and show that soldiers have higher subjective discount rates than non-soldiers. In a companion paper based on the same soldier experiments, Ruffle and Tobol (2014) show that temporally distancing decisions from the receipt of payment increases honest reporting. Specifically, soldiers who participated in the dierolling experiment on earlier days of the week reported low outcomes on average than those who participated closer to the end of the week. Soldiers' military entrance scores served merely as a control variable in the analysis and was not explored in any depth. In the current paper, we focus on the relationship between military entrance scores and honesty and test the robustness of our findings on a civilian population. 4 To a lesser extent they also cheat their colleagues because a soldier who leaves the army base early necessitates that his uncompleted duties are distributed among those soldiers who remain behind.
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Experiment Design, Procedures and Sample
We approached all of the combat and non-combat military units for which we might possibly receive permission -the elite air force units were omitted. Our sample consists of 15 distinct army units that granted us permission to conduct the experiment. These units were distributed across 27 different permanent and provisional military bases throughout Israel. 5 All 427 soldiers in our sample were serving in their first of three years of required military service during which they participate in basic training through completing courses. All of the experiments were conducted just prior to the soldiers' breakfast hour in the dining hall. The cadet coordinator (CC) of the participating army unit called each soldier by name one-at-a-time to a room or large tent with two entrances/exits located on the army base and used for the purpose of the experiment. Each participating soldier entered through one designated entrance. The CC then read the rules of the experiment from a script to the soldier. Namely, the soldier was told that s/he would be asked to roll a 6-sided die in private and then to report the outcome to the CC. For each point on the die, the soldier would be released on Thursday half an hour ahead of the scheduled time. To avoid any possible confusion, the exact payment in the form of hours of early release for each of the six possible outcomes was enumerated. The soldier was told that, after all soldiers in the unit had completed the experiment, the CC would submit the list of early release times to the unit commander who had approved the experiment and the terms of early release.
The soldier was handed a 6-sided die and proceeded to a table at the other side of the room or tent, out of sight of the CC. After rolling the die in private, the soldier returned to the CC to report the outcome. Finally, the soldier completed a brief post-experiment questionnaire (included in Appendix A), submitted it to the CC and was directed to proceed to the dining hall through the door or tent opening designated as the exit and through which he had not entered. The distinction between the two doors or tent openings as entrance and exit was maintained to prevent soldiers from having contact with others who had not yet participated in the experiment. The CC called in the next soldier according to the list and so on until all soldiers in the unit had completed the experiment.
The entire experiment including the questionnaire took about seven minutes for each soldier. In view of the value soldiers attribute to an early release of half an hour (median = 30 NIS, see rows 2 and 3 of the left panel of Table 1 ) and of three hours (median = 100 NIS, row 4 of 
Overall Distribution
The distribution of reported die outcomes for our entire sample of soldiers (N=427) is displayed in Soldiers clearly inflate their reported outcomes, but do not profit maximize. 8 What is more striking is the observed decline in frequency from 5 to 6. While Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) also report incomplete cheating, they still register a higher percentage of subjects who report the highest outcome, whereas we witness a sharp decline. One explanation for our observed decline in 6 Consider the following back-of-the-envelope calculation. The average soldier reported a die outcome of 3.87 (see row 1 of left panel of Table 1 ), equivalent to 1.94 hours early release. If we assume, for simplicity, that the median willingness to pay increases linearly with each additional half hour of early release, then the median willingness to pay for 1.94 hours equals 58.1 NIS for seven minutes of work. Contrast this with combat soldiers' monthly wage of 700 NIS and non-combat soldiers' monthly salary of between 300 and 500 NIS, depending on their job. At the time of the experiments, 3.5 NIS equaled $1 USD. 7 Further evidence against uniformly distributed die outcomes comes from the frequencies of reported 1s and 2s, both significantly less than the percentage of 16.67% expected from a uniform distribution (p<.001 from one-sided Binomial tests in both cases). At the same time, the frequencies of 4s and 5s, are significantly greater than 16.67% (p=.04 and p<.001, respectively). Only the frequencies of reported 3s and 6s cannot be rejected as significantly different from 16.67% (p=.13 and p=.38, respectively).
8 Incomplete cheating appears to be a robust finding in the emerging literature on cheating regardless of whether the die-rolling paradigm (e.g., Shalvi et al. 2011 , Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi 2013 , Hao and Houser 2013 or some other experimental method is used (e.g., Gneezy 2005 , Charness and Dufwenberg 2006 , Erat and Gneezy 2012 reported 6s is that payments are publicly observable. A soldier seen leaving the base three hours early on Thursday may be concerned that his peers will view him as dishonest.
<insert Figure 1 about here>
Honesty and Military Entrance Score
Months prior to recruitment to the Israeli military, every candidate soldier is evaluated on the basis of his or her educational background and a series of computerized psycho-technical exams. In addition to cognitive-ability measures, numerous questions on the psycho-technical exams are designed to evaluate the soldier's honesty by, for instance, framing the same question in multiple ways or otherwise asking as many ten variations of the same question to test for consistent responses. Furthermore, males undergo a lengthy personal interview in which the candidate's honesty is evaluated through several channels. First, highly skilled female interviewers aim to assess the male soldier's "body language, to identify lies and individuals who are unreliable"
(Hebrew Wikipedia under "recruitment to the Israeli military"). 9 What is more, candidate soldiers are asked a battery of questions, the answers to which are either already known (e.g., "Have you been caught stealing or otherwise been in trouble with the police?"), can be verified by contacting the appropriate authority (e.g., "Have you ever skipped school?", "What would your high school teachers say about you?") or can be cross-checked with the candidate's responses on the written exam (e.g., "Have you ever used drugs?", "Are you seeking the ideal partner or willing to compromise?").
For male soldiers, the final test score (known as kaba in Hebrew and to be subsequently referred to as such for brevity) is made up of the interview (33%), the psycho-technical exams (50%) and the candidate's educational background (e.g., school attended, absences, any recorded discipline issues) and achievements (e.g, grades, clubs, distinctions) (17%). Women do not undergo the interview. Instead, their kaba is based on the psycho-technical exams (60%) and their educational background and achievements (40%).
An individual's kaba determines the unit and job to which he is assigned for his military service. The kaba scores range from 41 to 56. Special significance is accorded to 52, the required cutoff to qualify for an officer's course that is offered only after non-combat soldiers have completed a full year of mandatory military service and combat soldiers have completed two years of service. 10 All of the soldiers in our sample were serving in their first year of military service during which the military training and experiences of those who are eligible and those who are ineligible to become officers are identical. It is noteworthy that a kaba of 54 constitutes the minimum score to qualify to be an interviewer, with most having attained a rare perfect score of 56. What is more, the criteria for selecting interviewers are considered to be more stringent than any other unit in the IDF (Lerer 2009, pp. 20-32) .
Through each unit's commanding officer and unbeknown to the soldier, we obtained every participating soldier's kaba. Figure 2 displays the distribution separately for females and males.
The most unusual feature of these distributions is the paucity of near-miss scores of 50 and 51, accounting for a combined 21-22% of the sample. At the same time, the highest frequency is associated with 52 (the threshold to qualify for an officer), followed by 49, which together constitute about 30% of the sample. 11 These features suggest that the Israeli military wishes to enlarge the pool of eligible officers. To do so, it uses the subjective components of the kaba score, namely, the personal interview in the case of males and the evaluation of the candidate's educational background, to boost to 52 the scores of soldiers deemed suitable.
The distribution of entrance scores reveals that 48.2% of soldiers in our sample qualify to be officers. Interestingly, Lerer (2009, p. 165) reports an identical figure (48%) for the fraction of soldiers with a kaba of 52 or higher in 1995 (the most recent year for which he obtained data).
<insert Figure 2 about here>
The weighted scatter plot in Figure 3 displays the distribution of reported die outcomes for each kaba score. The size of the circle reflects the number of observations at this kaba-die outcome pair. The figure also includes two regression curves fitted to the data. The OLS line displays a negative slope, in other words, the higher a soldier's kaba, the lower his reported die outcome on average. So as not to impose a linear fit on the data, we also estimate a kernel regression (shown in 9 red in Figure 3 ). This curve too is negatively sloped up to and including a kaba of 54, after which a modest upturn is observed.
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The OLS regression in (1) of Table 2 pinpoints the magnitude and statistical significance of the negative relationship: for every additional point a soldier obtained on his kaba, he reports 0.13 points less on the die outcome (p<.01). 14 Regression (2) demonstrates that this highly significant negative relationship between a soldier's reported die outcome and his kaba remains robust to the inclusion of numerous controls. These controls include the soldier's self-reported willingness to pay for one half-hour early release from the military base, indicator variables for whether the soldier is female, religious, and an interaction term between these two, and from a city, and the soldier's response to a question about the extent to which he generally tells the truth. 15 The majority of the controls do not differ significantly from zero in this or any subsequent regression.
One exception is that secular female soldiers report weakly significantly higher die outcomes than secular males in this regression only. 16 The mean die outcomes reported by males and females do not differ significantly from one another in any of the other regressions. Soldiers from cities (defined by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics as settlements with more than 20,000 residents) report significantly higher die outcomes than those from rural areas in this and all subsequent regressions.
A soldier's willingness to pay for early release is not quite marginally statistically significant in predicting a soldier's decision to claim additional early release (p=.12). According to Table 1 , the mean willingness to pay for a half-hour early release is 42.7 NIS. A standard deviation of 67.2 that exceeds the mean by more than 50% and a median of 30 NIS both attest to outliers. If we exclude observations that deviate from the mean by more than two standard deviations, the 13 Warner and Pleeter (2001) also observe unique behavior among the two highest categories of entrance exam scores in the U.S. military. In particular, they exploit a natural experiment conducted by the U.S. Department of Defense to reduce military personnel in which mid-career personnel were offered the choice between a lump-sum separation payment and an annuity valued at considerably more in present terms. Personnel belonging to the top groups display lower rates of discount (i.e., more patience) than their peers, as evidenced by their higher likelihood of preferring an annuity to a lump-sum retirement payment. 14 The regressor is expressed as soldier i's kaba minus 52 for ease of interpretation. Thus, the constant of 3.76 refers to the average die outcome reported by a soldier with a kaba of 52.
median remains unchanged, while the mean and standard deviation drop to 33.9 NIS and 28.1 NIS respectively (N=412). Regression (3) excludes these 15 outlying observations, but is otherwise identical to (2) . The coefficient on the willingness-to-pay variable increases sevenfold to .007 and is highly significant (p=.01). At the same time, the kaba coefficient of -0.11 in (3) remains highly significant.
<insert Figure 3 about here> <insert Table 2 about here> Figure 4 displays histograms of die reports separately for soldiers with a kaba score of 52 or more and those below 52. The figure distinctly displays that soldiers with a kaba score below 52 report higher outcomes on average (mean die report of 4.21, median and mode of 5) than those with a kaba above 52 (mean report of 3.5, median and mode of 4). A t-test soundly rejects the equality of the mean reports for these two groups of soldiers (t=4.66, p<.001).
<insert Figure 4 about here> Lower die reports do not necessarily imply increased honesty. It could be that soldiers with a high kaba score underreport 5s and 6s to such an extent that they are actually less honest than their counterparts with a low kaba scores. This turns out not to be the case. The left panel of the Only the reports of 6s (25/206 or 12.1% of the observations) differ significantly from 1/6 (p=.045).
Whether we compare the distributions of reported die outcomes for soldiers above and below a kaba of 52, or first invert the distribution of outcomes for those with a kaba 52 or more such that the transformed distribution, Y, equals 7 minus the outcome from the original distribution, both the non-parametric Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (based on the maximum difference between the two cumulative distribution functions) and non-parametric rank-sum Wilcoxon-Mann-
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Whitney strongly reject the equivalence of the outcomes reported by soldiers below and soldiers above the threshold of 52 (p<.001 for all four tests). 17 We conclude that lower die reports among soldiers with higher kaba scores indeed reflect significantly more honesty.
There are three possible explanations for the positive association between a soldier's honesty and his entrance score. First, with its emphasis on the value of honesty among its soldiers, the Israeli military has designed a test that successfully predicts honesty. Second, soldiers behave reciprocally toward the military: soldiers know their entrance scores and use our experiment to reward or to punish the military for a high or low score received, respectively. Third, reputational concerns: a soldier whose high kaba score qualifies him to be an officer may be considering a career in the military and does not want to jeopardize his future by being perceived as greedy or dishonest by his fellow soldiers or commanding officer.
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In the next section, we present a follow-up die-rolling experiment on civilians who have completed their military service. This follow-up experiment will allow us to: 1) determine whether the predictive power of the kaba is robust to an alternative sample population and setting; 2)
control for the reciprocity and reputation explanations; and 3) evaluate which, if any, of the various components of kaba predict honesty. In the meantime, our dataset from the experiment on soldiers allows us to further explore the reciprocity explanation from above.
To test whether reciprocity can explain our main result, we introduced two questions midway through the data collection process: 217 soldiers were asked whether they knew their entrance score and, if so, what it was (see questions 8 and 9 of Appendix A). In our sample, 15%
of soldiers admitted to not knowing their entrance score. Among those who claimed to know their score, only 47% indicated the correct score. Of the 53% of the soldiers who incorrectly guessed 12 their score, the vast majority (92/97) overestimated it. The average guess among soldiers who mistakenly guessed their score was 1.98 points higher than the actual score (s.d.=0.14).
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If soldiers use our experiment to express their appreciation for a high entrance score and the enhanced opportunities that such a score furnishes or to express their dissatisfaction with their low score, then we would expect a significant negative relationship between a soldier's guess about his score and his reported die outcome. Regression (4) replaces a soldier's true entrance score with his guess. The estimated coefficient is actually positive (0.09), but not significantly different from zero (p=.24). The coefficient remains close to and not significantly different from zero when our set of control variables is included in (5) . By contrast, the parallel regressions in (6) and (7) that use the same sample of 185 soldiers, replacing their guess with their true score, reveal highly significant coefficients of -0.18 (p=.001) and -0.13 (p=.05), respectively. In short, reciprocity cannot explain the observed relationship between honesty and soldiers' test scores.
Follow-up Experiment on Civilians
Motivation, Experimental Design and Procedures
What specifically accounts for the seeming effectiveness of the Israeli military's entrance exam in classifying soldiers in terms of their degree of honesty? The calculation of the kaba is sufficiently complex that the specific components of the test that are most effective remain shrouded in mystery. Moreover, we have yet to test the hypothesis that reputational concerns account for our observed relationship between a soldier's reported die outcome and his kaba score. With these questions in mind, we replicated our experiment on a sample of civilian subjects who had 19 Our observation that as many as 40% (.47*(1-.15)) of soldiers correctly guessed their kaba and those who guessed incorrectly were off by "only" 2 points on average are not surprising. Before entering the military, every recruit provides a preference ordering over military units in which he wishes to serve. Since different units require different kaba thresholds, a recruit's acceptance to or rejection from his preferred unit(s) provides him with an update about the possible range of his kaba.
In an effort to avoid the reputational concerns possibly present in a faculty-led experiment conducted on students and to recruit a more diverse subject pool, we bypassed the university, choosing instead to conduct the experiments at the Malha Shopping Mall in Jerusalem. In collaboration with the shopping mall's management, we placed a reception desk and a table with cardboard partitions (the type used for voting in Israeli elections) in the mall's concourse for the purpose of recruiting and conducting the experiment. Before permitting a candidate subject to participate in the experiment, we asked whether the subject had completed mandatory military service (in order that we can later obtain the subject's kaba score). Upon submitting the completed questionnaire the subject received payment.
Because we required completion of military service to participate in our experiment, this civilian subject pool is necessarily older (mean age=25, minimum age=20, s.d.=2.6 years) than our sample of 18-year-old soldiers. Moreover, 52% are male, 90% completed high school, 47% hold a college or university degree, 67% report having at least one parent with a college or university degree, 72.4% are born in Israel, and 81.8% are single, 16.9% married and 1.3% divorced. The right panel of Table 1 provides additional summary statistics for the civilian sample. Figure 5 displays the distribution of reported die outcomes for the civilian sample (N=156).
Experimental Results
Overall Distribution
Similar to the corresponding distribution for soldiers discussed in section 3.1 and displayed in Figure 1 , a Pearson chi-square test rejects that all subjects report their true die outcome; namely, the empirical distribution is significantly different from a uniform distribution ( 2 (5)  = 19.8, p=.001). Moreover, one-sided Binomial tests show that the frequencies of reported 1s and 2s are significantly less than 16.67%, while the frequencies of reported 4s, 5s and 6s are significantly greater than 16.67% (all p<.001). Only the frequency of reported 3s cannot be rejected as significantly different from 16.67% (p=.70). Accounting for 25% of reported die outcomes, 4 is the modal outcome, with the frequency of reports declining modestly for 5 and again for 6. Thus, even with the lack of an ongoing relationship with the experimenter and unobservability by their peers, the overwhelming majority of subjects still refrain from maximizing their monetary earnings.
Whether the soldiers' and civilians' distributions of reported outcomes differ significantly from one another depends on the choice of statistical test. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov test fails to reject the equality of distributions (p=.18), whereas the Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test rejects their equality (p=.05). To the extent that there is a difference, it appears to be driven largely by the relative abundance of soldiers willing to report 1s and 2s. In fact, if we exclude die reports of 1 and 2 and perform the same Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test on the truncated distributions, we no longer come close to rejecting the equality of soldiers' and civilians' distributions (p=.81).
<insert Figure 5 about here>
Robustness of Results on Civilian Sample with Monetary Payoffs
The weighted scatter plot in Figure 6 displays the distribution of civilians' reported die outcomes for each kaba score. The OLS and kernel regressions displayed in this figure as well as the regressions in Table 3 reveal that the observed significant and negative relationship between a soldier's kaba and his reported die outcome continues to hold on this sample of civilians who receive cash payments for their die reports. More precisely, for every additional point a civilian subject obtained on his kaba, regression (8) shows that he reports about 0.2 points less on the die (p<.001). This holds regardless of the collection of control variables that we include alongside the subject's kaba score. Regression (9) contains the same set of control variables as those reported on the soldier sample in Table 2 . 20 The coefficient on Δ kaba from 52 remains unchanged at 0.2 and highly significant (p<.001). At the same time, none of the socio-demographic controls, the selfreport responses about one's own honesty and about the importance of what others think is significantly different from zero. The lone exception is that religious male subjects report 0.63 points less on the die than their secular male counterparts (p=.07). Recall that in the soldier sample, the only consistently significant socio-demographic or self-report variable was whether the participant was a city resident: city residents claimed more. The sign on the city-resident indicator variable flips to negative among civilians, but is not significantly different from zero (p=.20). It is thus noteworthy that the kaba score stands out as the only significant predictor of the participant's reported die outcome in both the soldier and civilian samples.
<insert Table 3 about here> <insert Figure 6 about here>
In addition to the controls present in regression (9), regression (10) includes questions asked only in the civilian survey, several of which were summarized in section 4.1. The estimate on the Δ kaba from 52 variable remains highly significant (p<.001) and its magnitude increases slightly to 0.23. None of the other variables that were also estimated in (9), including the civilian's religiosity, is significantly different from zero. Among the ten variables unique to regression (10), none is significant with the exception of whether the subject completed high school. As displayed in (10), high school graduates report 0.81 pips less on the die than those who did not finish high school (p=.07). 21 This result foretells one of the central findings from the next subsection and main lessons from this follow-up experiment.
In section 3.2 we presented evidence inconsistent with the hypothesis that reciprocity accounts for the observed positive relationship between the kaba score and honesty. That the kaba score continues to predict subjects' reported die outcomes on a civilian subject pool drives another nail in the coffin of the reciprocity hypothesis and provides strong evidence against the officer reputation hypothesis. As far as subjects were concerned, this experiment had nothing to do with the military or kaba scores. Moreover, the payment was in cash. Yet, strikingly, years after taking the military entrance exam and completing their military service, these civilian subjects' scores continue to forecast their degree of honesty in this die-rolling experiment.
Decomposing the Military Entrance Score
What remains is to understand which kaba items predict honesty in our experiment. The self-report honesty question that appears in both the soldier survey (question 4 of Appendix A) and civilian survey (question 31 of Appendix B) is never significantly different from zero in any of the regression specifications. In the civilian survey, we included additional self-report honesty measures (questions 39 and 44) as well as a disguised variation of question 31 (question 46) to determine whether respondents' consistency in answering questions 31 and 46 can explain their die report. 22 Also, in an attempt to mimic the psycho-technical nature of the kaba exam, the civilian 21 The significance and lack thereof of each of these variables is robust to whichever subset of regressors is included in the specification. 22 In question 31, we ask "Which of the following sentences best describes you?" with "a. I always tell the truth," "b. I almost always tell the truth," "c. I usually tell the truth," and "d. I tell the truth when it is convenient for me" as the possible responses. Question 46 reads, "Do you speak the truth in your daily life?" with the set of answers, "a. always," "b. generally," "c. sometimes," and "d. when I stand to gain from it." The absence of a one-to-one correspondence between the two sets of responses requires us to be liberal in our definition of consistency and minimizes the likelihood of a type-1 error in incorrectly inferring that a subject is lying or inconsistent in responding to questionnaire includes: 1) the 12-item abbreviated version of the Raven Advanced Progressive
Matrices Test developed by Arthur and Day (1994) and based on the original 60-item test (Raven 1936) for the purpose of measuring cognitive ability (questions 19-30); 2) the 3-item cognitive reflection task (abbreviated as CRT hereafter) developed by Frederick (2005) to test subjects' ability to overcome their impulse to write the intuitive and incorrect response in order to think through the problem and arrive at the correct answer (see questions 33, 38, and 44). 23 The first two columns in Tables 4 and 5 Raven test scores of 5 through 9 have been combined so that all cells contain at least 25
observations. Take notice of the pronounced shift from reporting a 6 for low Raven and CRT scores to reporting a 1, 2 or 3 as these test scores increase. To illustrate, 47.5% of subjects who score between a 5 and a 9 on the Raven test claim to have rolled a 6. This percentage plunges to 21.4% for Raven scores of 10, and drops further to about 11% for the highest Raven scores of 11 and 12. At the same time, the combined outcomes of 1, 2 and 3 account for a mere 10% for Raven scores between 5 and 9, more than doubling to 21.5% for Raven scores of 10, and again nearly doubling to 37%-42% for scores of 11 and 12.
<insert Tables 4 and 5 about here> This shift in outcomes from a 6 to a 1, 2 or 3 as subjects' cognitive abilities increase is no less dramatic for the CRT scores. While 41.5% of those who answered no questions correctly on the CRT reported a 6, this percentage progressively shrivels to 18.4% for a score of 1, to 17.5% for a score of 2 and to 7.7% for a perfect score of 3. Concurrently, only 14.7% of subjects who scored the two questions. While 31a corresponds perfectly to 46a, 31b may be consistent with either 46a or 46b; 31c matches 46b or 46c, and 31d may correspond to 46c or 46d. Even with this charitable definition of consistency, we still find that 18% of subjects unambiguously contradict themselves in responding to the two questions with 57% of the inconsistent choices being 31a ("I always tell the truth") and 46c ("sometimes").
a 0 claim a 1, 2 or 3, compared to 22.4% for those who score a 1, 35% for a score of 2 and 53.9%
for a score of 3. The regressions in Table 6 quantify these relationships and confirm the strong predictive power of the Raven and CRT test scores. Regression (11) shows that for each additional correct answer on the Raven test, a subject reports 0.28 pips less on the die outcome (p<.001). Similarly, for every CRT question answered correctly subjects claim 0.29 fewer pips on the die (p=.047).
Regression (12), on the other hand, includes as regressors only the self-report honesty questions and a response-consistency check among two of these questions. The signs of these five estimates vary from positive to negative and none is different from zero at conventional significance levels.
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Finally, regression (13) includes the full set of controls that were also included (both those displayed and not displayed) in regression (10) of Table 3 . Among these are the civilian's selfreported income, employment status and whether he holds a university degree and at least one of his parents does, none of which comes close to be significantly different from zero, thereby ruling out the hypothesis that the role of cognitive ability is rooted in an individual's income or incomeearning potential. Moreover, none of the self-report honesty measures differs significantly from zero -p-values range from .27 to .79 -whereas the estimates and the significance of the Raven and CRT scores remain virtually unchanged -although the CRT estimate of -.29 is now only weakly significantly different from 0 (p=.064).
25 24 Responses to the four self-report honesty questions are coded (as in Appendix B) such that higher values correspond to less honesty. The coefficient of -.29 on the self-report honesty variable has a p-value of .11; but its negative sign implies that the less truthful a subject claims to be, the lower his reported die outcome. 25 In a within-subject online experiment, Hugh-Jones (2015) finds that honest behavior is positively correlated in a coin-flip and a quiz experiment. Yet, a self-report honesty question about whether lying in one's self-interest is justifiable fails to predict behavior in either honesty experiment. At the same time, Hugh-Jones also includes selfreport questions about whether the respondent had engaged in any one of four ethically questionable actions in the past 12 months (e.g., avoid fare on public transport, fabricate information on a job application). Reports of unethical actions do predict dishonesty in both experiments. These findings suggest that questions about actual participation in specific forms of dishonest behavior may be better predictors of dishonesty in incentivized experiments than general self-report questions about honesty.
<insert Table 6 about here>
The implication of these findings is that the kaba score predicts honesty in our experiments because it incorporates cognitive ability. Yet it could be that the kaba score and our two measures of cognitive ability independently explain variation in reported die outcomes. The Pearson correlation coefficient of .80 between the civilian's kaba and Raven scores and a similarly high correlation of .66 between the kaba and CRT scores indicate that the kaba score's effectiveness indeed operates through its testing of cognitive ability. By contrast, the absolute value of the Pearson correlation coefficient between the kaba score and any of the five self-report honesty measures never exceeds .09.
One plausible, almost tautological, explanation for the observed relationship between CRT scores and honesty is that subjects who overcome their impulse to write down the intuitive, but incorrect, answers in the CRT in order to think their way through to the correct answers are the same subjects who contemplate the costs and benefits of different die reports and resist reporting a 6. 26 Similarly, subjects who succeed in solving the progressively trickier questions on the Raven test also think more about their choice in the die-reporting experiment and come to the realization that the monetary-payoff-maximizing report of 6 is not necessarily utility maximizing.
Why might someone who (over)thinks his decision in the die-reporting experiment choose not to inflate his report or claim a 6? One possibility is that such subjects suspect that the true outcome of their die roll may be observable by others. Perhaps a hidden camera records their roll.
Second and even more plausibly, subjects who score high on the cognitive tests recognize that inflating their report to the maximum possible outcome of 6 forces them to confront the reality that they are cheaters. These subjects decide that preserving their positive self-image is worth more than the additional shekels to be gained from succumbing to the impulse to cheat. 27 Whichever of these two overthinking explanations is correct, both point to subjects' concern with their image, whether it be in the eyes of others or self.
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A second possible explanation is that high-cognitive ability individuals are faster at both learning and applying the social norm of honesty. More specifically, when placed in a novel situation, an individual needs first to interpret the situation before deciding how to respond. High cognitive-ability subjects are better able to identify the die-rolling experiment as a test of their honesty and thus opt to obey the social norm. 
Conclusions
The Israel Defense Forces requires every candidate soldier to take an entrance exam that measures cognitive ability and honesty, among other traits. We find that a soldier's exam score predicts his degree of honesty in an incentivized experiment in which soldiers receive early release from the military base in accordance with their reported outcome from a privately observed die roll.
Moreover, in a parallel experiment on civilians in which financial incentives are substituted, this same relationship between exam score and honesty continues to hold. Closer inspection of the components of the entrance exam reveals that self-report measures of one's overall honesty and a consistency check among them are of no value in explaining subjects' honesty. Rather, two distinct measures of cognitive ability both predict the variation in subjects' honesty. The nature of the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi die-rolling task proffers a sensible explanation for this result.
Namely, the benefits from cheating are clear and salient (e.g., earlier release from the base, an extra 40 NIS in payment), while the costs are not immediately apparent and may even be altogether uncertain (e.g., detection, suspicion of having cheated, eroded (self-)image). We propose that higher cognitive-ability subjects think through these costs and, as a result, resist the temptation to inflate their die reports.
The question then arises of whether this result generalizes to other tests of honesty. We argue below that it might, with two caveats. In most truth-telling dilemmas, the benefit to lying is tangible and immediate (e.g., impress another, avoid reprimand or punishment) and, by definition, serves as the very motivation for not telling the truth. At the same time, the cost of lying is uncertain (e.g., probability of detection, can I live with myself?) and likely borne in the (possibly distant) future (e.g., after detection, following years of soul-searching). As a result, while everyone is aware of the gain from telling a lie in a given situation, higher cognitive-ability types may be more aware or better able to assess the expected costs. One caveat concerns the assumption that the benefit to lying is always obvious: if the costs of lying are salient and transparent to all, while the gains from dishonesty are hidden, perhaps those of higher cognitive ability are more likely to recognize and pursue cheating opportunities. A second caveat concerns access to cheating opportunities: to the extent that higher cognitive-ability individuals attain greater success in their careers, they will have greater access to resources and power and, accordingly, more frequent occasions and larger temptations to cheat.
This discussion hints at several juicy directions for future research. If higher-cognitive types prove to be no more honest in other truth-telling tasks, then the salience of the gains from cheating and obscurity of the expected costs in the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi die-rolling experiment may be a special case. Such a finding would call into question the representativeness of the die-rolling task as a gauge of honesty. Notes: 1) The die outcome refers to the roll of the die reported; the WTP variables (soldiers only) indicate the willingness to pay for a half-hour and a three-hour early release from the base (median values are displayed to the right of the means); the military test score outcomes in our sample range from 45-56; the indicator variables "claim know test score", "actual know test score", "female", "religious" and "city resident" indicate the fraction of participants that claims to know their army test score, the fraction that knows their true test score; the fractions of female soldiers, religious soldiers and soldiers from cities, respectively; participants also answered questions on the extent to which they generally tell the truth ("self-reported honesty") and how important it is to them what others think of them ("others think"). See Appendix A for the precise wording of the questions. guess about his kaba minus 52; indicator variables for whether the participant is female, religious, and an interaction term between the two, from a city (or a rural area); his self-reported honesty (question 4 in Appendix B), the importance he attributes to what others think of him (question 5 in Appendix B) and whether he finished high school. The controls included, but not displayed, in regression (10) are the participant's self-reported high-school matriculation grade, whether he holds a college or university degree, whether at least one of his parents does, whether he was born in Israel, his rating of the neighborhood in which he grew up, whether he works, his income and a selfreported measure of how hardworking he is. 3. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors in parentheses. 4. Coefficient significantly different from 0 at the 1% level ***, at the 5% level **, at the 10% level *. 
